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1. Introduction  
The prohibition of abuse of dominance constitutes an integral part of any competition law regime; 
given the fact that abusive practices tend to distort the competitive process. This is why peculiarities 
in treatment of abuse of dominance in one way or another may be formidable to the extent that they 
may eventually harm economies of concerned nations. Peculiarities in this respect may appear in two 
forms. First, where the competition law at stake does not regulate or discipline certain abusive 
practices, and; second, where the competition authority in question employs an enforcement approach 
that may not be suitable to it at the current stage.  
 
The aim of this paper is to explore these peculiarities and to evaluate their potential effects on the 
Egyptian market and, in turn, economy. The paper will start off by analysing the treatment of abuse of 
dominance under Egyptian Competition Law, while exploring peculiarities in such treatment. It will 
then move on to evaluate the potential effects of such peculiarities on the Egyptian market and 
economy. The final part will attempt to tackle these peculiarities.  
  
2. The treatment of abuse of dominance under Egyptian Competition Law 
2.1 Determination of dominance 
Dominance is defined under Article 4 of Law No. 3 of 2005 Promulgating the Law on Protection 
of Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices (‘Law No. 3/2005’) as follows: 
“dominance in a relevant market is the ability of a person2, holding a market share 
exceeding 25% of the aforementioned market, to have an effective impact on prices or on 
                                                 
1 D.Phil. Candidate (University of Sussex). The views expressed in this paper are personal. The author would 
like to thank Professor Malcolm Ross, Dr. Peter Holmes and Dr. Yuri Borgmann-Prebil (University of Sussex) 
for their valuable comments on an earlier draft. The author is also thankful to Dr. Ahmed Ghoneim for initially 
recommending him to contribute in the Mediterranean Competition Bulletin.          
2 The term ‘person’ encompasses “Natural and juristic persons, economic entities, unions, financial associations 
and groupings, groups of persons, whatever their means of incorporation, and other related parties”. Article 2(a), 
Law No. 3 of 2005 promulgating the Law on Protection of Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic 
Practices  
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the volume of supply on it, without his competitors having the ability to limit it”3. In this 
sense, for a firm to be found dominant under Law No. 3/2005, it has to satisfy the following 
pre-requisites: 
1. Market share exceeds 25% of the relevant market4; 
2. The ability to have an effective impact on prices or volume of output; and 
3. The inability of competitors to limit such ability.  
 
It is important to note that the pre-requisites above-mentioned all ought to be satisfied. This means 
that if the Egyptian Competition Authority (‘ECA’) and/or Court finds that the firm under scrutiny 
does not satisfy one of these pre-requisites, it shall not resume its appraisal of the remaining criteria; 
and will thus not find that firm as dominant. That said; the ECA has shown reluctance to rely on 
market share thresholds for dominance findings. For instance, in the cement case, albeit finding Suez 
Group to have held a threshold of 30%, the ECA did not reach a dominance finding on the basis of not 
satisfying other pre-requisites5. Likewise, in its study of the vegetable oil market, the ECA found that 
although one of the companies held 45.56% of the relevant market, it was not dominant on the basis 
of its inability to have an effective impact on prices6. This means that market share thresholds provide 
no more than a first indication that guides the ECA on whether to analyse the remaining criteria.       
 
Article 8 of the Prime Ministerial Decree No. 1316 of 2005 issuing the Executive Regulations of 
Protection of Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices Law No. 3 of 2005 (‘executive 
regulations’) expands on the generic stipulation provided by Article 4. It provides that: “the person 
shall have effective impact on the prices of the products or the quantity supplied in the relevant 
market if this person has the ability, through his/her individual acts, to determine the prices of these 
products or the quantity supplied in that market where his/her competitors do not have the ability to 
prevent these acts, taking into consideration the following factors:  
 
a) The person's share in the relevant market and his/her position in comparison to the remaining 
competitors; 
b) The conduct of the person in the relevant market in the previous period; 
c) The number of competing persons in the relevant market and its relative impact on the structure of 
that market; 
d) The ability of the person and his/her competitors to obtain the raw materials necessary for 
production; and 
e) The existence of barriers facing other persons to enter the relevant market”7 
 
While investigating whether or not a firm(s) is in a dominant position in light of the three conditions 
stipulated under Article 4, the above-mentioned factors are collectively given due consideration. For 
                                                 
3 Article 4, Law No. 3 of 2005 promulgating the Law on Protection of Competition and Prohibition of 
Monopolistic Practices 
4 Market share threshold is the percentage quantifying the volume of sales that a firm attains in the relevant 
market. See O’Donoghue, R. & Padilla, A. J. (2006) “The Law and Economics of Article [102 TFEU]” First 
Edn., Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, p.109 
5 Report of the Egyptian Competition Authority “Study on the Cement Market in the Arab Republic of Egypt in 
light of the Law on Protection of Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices” Study by virtue of the 
Minister of Trade and Industry’s request dated 16th July, 2006 [Report in Arabic], published on the website on 
5th September, 2008, available from: (http://www.eca.org.eg/ECA/Publication/List.aspx?CategoryID=1) 
accessed 01-10-2009, p.29 
6 See Report of the Egyptian Competition Authority “Study of the Vegetable Oil Market light of the Law on 
Protection of Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices” Study by virtue of the Minister of Trade 
and Industry’s request dated 26th December, 2007 [Report in Arabic], published on the website in September, 
2010, available from: (http://www.eca.org.eg/ECA/Publication/List.aspx?CategoryID=1) accessed 15-09-2010, 
p.31 
7 Article 8, Prime Ministerial Decree No. 1316 of 2005 issuing the Executive Regulations of Protection of 
Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices Law No. 3 of 2005 
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instance, while determining whether or not the market share of a firm subject to investigation exceeds 
25% of the relevant market, the ECA compares that firm’s share with that held by its competitors. 
Moreover, a firm satisfies the ‘effective impact on prices’ criterion only if it is found that its 
competitors were obliged to set their prices below it; even in the case of higher levels of demand. In 
other words, the ECA may declare this criterion as satisfactory only if the firm in question was 
capable of setting its prices individually. In relation to the ‘ability to affect the volume of output’ 
criterion the ECA takes into account factors such as the firm’s total production capacity and the 
ability to obtain raw material; all of which to be made in comparison with its competitors. If it finds 
that the firm under scrutiny has privilege over its competitors at the time of the investigation, it may 
reach a finding that such criterion is fulfilled. With respect to the ‘inability of competitors to have an 
effective influence on prices or output’ criterion, the ECA takes into consideration factors such as 
legal barriers and the ability to establish new industries through often incurring irrecoverable costs 
(also known as sunk costs) to reach a finding over whether or not the firm under scrutiny satisfies 
such criterion.        
 
2.2 Abusive practices: Exploring peculiarities in Egyptian Law  
 
2.2.1 The lack of excessive pricing prohibition 
The fact that the list of abuses stipulated under Article 8 of Law No. 3/2005 is exhaustive and that it 
does not encompass excessive pricing implies that such practice is not prohibited in the Egyptian 
market8. In fact, the ECA’s chair-person, in her message in the Annual Report of 2006-2007, stated 
that: “[...] the increase in prices has become a major problem in the marketplace. Though [high] price 
is not directly addressed by the competition law, it can, however, indicate practices that violate the 
law”9. This may indeed explain why the ECA in various occasions conducted studies on markets 
primarily on the basis of high prices. For instance, the ECA conducted the study on the cement market 
due to the unjustified increase in cement prices10. In fact, its steel report was entitled: “study on 
justifications behind increase in prices of steel rebar in the Egyptian market”11. In other words, the 
                                                 
8 Note that there exists no precise definition for excessive pricing. Nonetheless, it is commonly perceived that 
prices are contemplated as fair if they are equivalent to “competitive” market prices; or otherwise not higher 
than these prices. The complexity, however, which competition authorities tend to face while investigating 
excessive pricing relates to the determination of the “competitive price” of the product or service at stake. There 
appears to be various approaches for such determination. For discussion of these approaches, see Evans, D. S. & 
Padilla, A. J. (2005) “Excessive pricing: using economics to define administrable legal rules” 1(1), Journal of 
Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, pp.100-101 
Aside of Egypt, some other jurisdictions (most notably U.S. antitrust law) do not prohibit excessive pricing. The 
debate over whether or not competition law should discipline excessive pricing is substantial. Opponents of 
regulating excessive pricing tend to argue that disciplining such practice may discourage innovation and cost 
reduction. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court had once stated that the “opportunity to charge monopoly prices – at 
least for a short period – is what attracts “business acumen” in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces 
innovation and economic growth”. See Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko LLP, 
540 US 398, 407 (2004)  
Moreover, it is often suggested that excessive pricing induces market entry – often known as market self-
correction. It is also argued that the determination of whether or not a price is excessive is multifaceted. It is 
equivocal as to which standards and benchmarks should investigators rely on. Proponents of an activist 
approach, on the other hand, tend to rely on the detrimental effects on consumers. For more insights on 
arguments for and against regulating excessive pricing, see Evans, D. S. & Padilla, A. J. (2005) “Excessive 
pricing: using economics to define administrable legal rules” 1(1), Journal of Competition Law and Economics. 
Oxford University Press; Ezrachi, A. & Gilo, D. (2008) “Are excessive prices really self-correcting?” 5(2), 
Journal of Competition Law and Economics, pp.254-262                 
9 Annual Report of the Egyptian Competition Authority, (2006/2007) published on the following website on 15th 
June, 2008, available from: (http://www.eca.org.eg/EgyptianCompetitionAuthority/Publication/List.aspx) 
accessed 16-06-2008, pp.3-4, emphasis added 
10 See Report of the Egyptian Competition Authority on the Cement Market. 
11 See Report of the Egyptian Competition Authority “Study on the justifications behind the increase in prices of 
Steel Rebar in the Egyptian Market in light of the Law on Protection of Competition and Prohibition of 
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25 
fact that the ECA rationalises its intervention by high prices in a given market does not necessarily 
mean that it deems excessive or generally high pricing, in itself, as a violation to competition law.  
 
It may be, however, surprising – and perhaps questionable – to some that the Law No. 3/2005 and its 
executive regulations stipulate the “ability of a person [...] to have an effective impact on prices [...] 
without his competitors having the ability to limit it [...]” as means for determination of dominance (as 
delineated earlier); whilst not explicitly prohibiting excessive pricing12. In essence, this stipulation 
means that a firm’s ability to increase market prices should not be influenced by its competitors’ 
ability to successfully undercut it. Hence, the difference between such stipulation and regulating 
excessive pricing is that the former stands as a means for determining dominance that is not in itself 
prohibited under Law No. 3/2005, while the latter is an abuse of such position. In other words, a firm 
may not be able to price excessively in a successful manner if it was not dominant in the first place.               
 
Nevertheless, some may argue that excessive pricing may develop in the form of refusal to deal and 
could, thus, be caught under Article 8(b) of Law No. 3/200513. Advocates of such view may invoke 
the procedures for investigating refusal to deal conducts stipulated under the executive regulations. 
More specifically, Article 13(b) prohibits a dominant firm from: “refraining from entry into sale or 
purchase transaction regarding a product with any person or totally ceasing to deal with it in a manner 
that results in restricting that person's freedom to access or exit the market at any time, which 
includes imposing financial conditions or obligations or abusive contractual conditions or conditions 
that are unusual in the activity subject matter of dealings”14. 
 
However, an argument as such may be countered on the basis that the wording of Article 13(b) seems 
to primarily confine the prohibition to upstream market dealings or dealings amid producers, 
suppliers, distributors, wholesalers or retailers and, as such, may not extend to consumers. Moreover, 
Article 13(b), though may be construed to prohibit imposing high or abusive prices, is in fact limited 
to the situation where the purchase agreement in question does not come into force. This means that 
the tangible effects of the excessiveness of prices are merely confined to the firm(s) which found that 
the sale conditions were deemed as unusual. In fact, in this case, the concerned firm’s welfare may 
not be deterred; in contrast with an explicit prohibition of excessive pricing which assumes that the 
transaction was concluded and that harm was inflicted on the relevant firm and/or consumers’ welfare. 
This signifies that Article 13(b) is only restricted to refusal to deal abuses and may not encompass an 
actual practice of excessive pricing.  
 
Moreover, it may be argued that high pricing could be prohibited in the form of price discrimination; 
in relation to the firm(s) incurring such prices, pursuant to Article 8(e) of Law No. 3/200515. However, 
such abusive practice assumes that the dominant firm at stake charges different prices to its 
customers; a practice which a dominant firm may not necessarily resort to. In other words, the 
dominant firm may rather choose to charge similar high prices to all its customers - a practice that 
would certainly not be caught under Article 8(e). In the same vein, the prohibition of price fixing 
among competitors, whilst this may often lead to high prices in the relevant market in question, does 
                                                                                                                                                        
Monopolistic Practices” Study by virtue of the Minister of Trade and Industry’s request dated 16th July, 2006 
[Report in Arabic], published on the website on 18th June, 2009, available from: 
(http://www.eca.org.eg/ECA/Resolution/List.aspx?CategoryID=2) accessed 02-11-2009 
12 Article 4, Law No. 3 of 2005 Promulgating the Law on Protection of Competition and Prohibition of 
Monopolistic Practices 
13 Article 8(b) of Law No. 3/2005 prohibits a dominant firm from “refraining to enter into sale or purchase 
transactions regarding a product with any Person or totally ceasing to deal with him in a manner that results in 
restricting that Person’s freedom to access or exit the market at any time”. 
14 Article 13(b), Prime Ministerial Decree No. 1316 of 2005 issuing the Executive Regulations of Protection of 
Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices Law No. 3 of 2005 
15 Article 8(e) of Law No. 3/2005 prohibits a dominant firm from: “discriminating between sellers or buyers 
having similar commercial positions in respect of sale or purchase prices or in the terms of the transaction”. 
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not cover all the common elements of prohibition of excessive price abuses. First, price fixing 
assumes the existence of an agreement on market prices – whether verbal or written - between two or 
more competitors (horizontal agreement). Second, such agreement may not necessarily relate to high 
prices16. Excessive pricing, on the opposed hand, may be practiced by one or more firms (that must be 
in a dominant position) and as such does not require an agreement among competitors.  
 
The concern pertaining to a prohibition of excessive pricing as such should instead be narrower in 
scope. If excessive pricing was to be prohibited, the Egyptian legislator would have provided a 
definition of excessive pricing and stipulated the necessary test. This includes the agreed upon 
benchmark that is ought to be followed in investigations. Consequently, the fact that the afore-
mentioned provisions may, in some occasions, discipline high pricing does not necessarily mean that 
they encompass excessive pricing; given the absence of a benchmark to determine the element of 
excessiveness.                 
 
2.2.2 An effects-based approach to abuse of dominance 
Article 8 of Law No. 3/2005 prohibits a dominant firm from exercising any of nine abuses. The 
approach for the appraisal of these abuses is stipulated primarily under the executive regulations. 
However, the approach does not seem to be consistent under Egyptian competition law. While Article 
13 of the executive regulations provides for an effects-based approach to some abuses, on the one 
hand,  it left it open for investigating authorities to choose between a per se approach or effects-based 
analysis in relation to other abuses, on the other hand. This seems to depend on whether or not the 
practice in question has no other purpose but to restrict competition or that may otherwise be 
objectively justified from a business point of view. Generally speaking, however, the Egyptian 
legislator seems to have required an effects-based approach to the majority of abuses prohibited under 
Article 8 of the Law No. 3/2005. 
 
More specifically, prohibiting a dominant firm from “undertaking an act that leads to the non-
manufacturing, or non-production or the non-distribution of a product for a certain period or periods 
of time” is decided by virtue of an effect-based approach17. This may be envisaged from the wording 
of Article 13(a) of the executive regulations: “[...] period or periods of time shall mean the period or 
periods of time that suffice to result in the prevention, restriction or harm of the freedom of 
competition”18. This entails that exercising a practice that limits the manufacturing, production or 
distribution process for a period of time in itself is not adequate for a dominant firm to be caught 
under Article 8(a). The ECA is required to prove that exercising such conduct during the period of 
time in question has distorted competition in the relevant market. The same approach seems to be 
required in relation to refusal to deal abuses. A dominant firm is not caught under Article 8(b) of Law 
No. 3/2005 unless its “refraining from entry into sale or purchase transactions regarding a product 
with any person or totally ceasing to deal with him” leads to “[...] restricting that person’s freedom to 
access or exit the market at any time [...]”19. In this sense, any dominant firm that refuses to deal with 
another firm – whether this concerns sale or purchase of a product – shall not be caught under Article 
8(b) unless such refusal undermines that firm’s ability to enter or exit the relevant market. 
  
Articles 8(c) of Law No. 3/2005 prohibits a dominant firm from “undertaking an act that limits 
distribution of specific product, on the basis of geographic areas, distribution centers, clients, seasons 
                                                 
16 See Article 6(a), Law No. 3 of 2005 Promulgating the Law on Protection of Competition and Prohibition of 
Monopolistic Practices; Articles 10, 11(a), Prime Ministerial Decree No. 1316 of 2005 issuing the Executive 
Regulations of Protection of Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices Law No. 3 of 2005 
17 Article 8(a), Law No. 3 of 2005 Promulgating the Law on Protection of Competition and Prohibition of 
Monopolistic Practices 
18 Article 13(a), Prime Ministerial Decree No. 1316 of 2005 issuing the Executive Regulations of Protection of 
Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices Law No. 3 of 2005 
19 Article 8(b), Law No. 3 of 2005 Promulgating the Law on Protection of Competition and Prohibition of 
Monopolistic Practices 
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or periods of time among persons with vertical relationships [...]”20. Article 8(c) as such left it open 
for investigating authorities to choose between an effects-based analysis or a per se approach. In other 
words, silence in relation to the approach of analysis under Law No. 3/2005 does not necessarily 
signify that investigating authorities should employ a per se approach; as EL-Far argues21. For 
instance, the ECA, in its steel study, employed an effects-based approach to this practice. It was 
particularly concerned with the compatibility of Ezz Group’s standard distribution agreement with 
Article 8(c). Article 4 of such agreement stipulates that: “in the event where the second party 
(approved distributor) refrains from receiving the quantities specified to him/her on a monthly basis 
by virtue of this agreement by a volume exceeding 10% of the quantity initially agreed upon due to 
reasons related to him/her and not the market for a period of two consecutive months, the first party 
(Ezz Group) shall be entitled to reduce his/her monthly quantity to the extent of the actual quantities 
received for the remaining period of the agreement”22. The ECA found that Ezz Group’s system of 
approved distributors and monthly portions did not violate competition law. As for the issue of 
reduction of quantities, it perceived that this approach may raise competition law compliance 
concerns. More specifically, it stated that a practice as such may lead to exclusivity in dealing with 
Ezz Group’s product. However, contrary to what El-Far suggests, the ECA concluded that such 
practice did not violate Article 8(c) on the premise that the volume of sales of other producers was not 
deterred. It indicated, on the contrary, that throughout the period of study, the demand on steel rebar 
in general significantly increased23.  
 
The Egyptian legislator, furthermore, stipulates an effects-based approach to price discrimination 
abuses. Article 13(e) of the executive regulations provides that: “discriminating between sellers or 
buyers having similar commercial positions in sale or purchase prices or in terms of the transactions, 
in a manner that weakens their ability to compete with one another or leads to drive out some of them 
from the market”. This means that price discrimination exercised by a dominant firm shall not be 
caught under Article 8(e) of Law No. 3/2005 unless it is proven that such practice undermines the 
position of related purchasers in the market or otherwise drives them out of the market. In the same 
vein, predatory pricing or pricing below marginal cost or average variable costs does follow the same 
approach. In fact, the Egyptian legislator stipulates a four-tiered test for determination of whether or 
not such pricing structure is anti-competitive. Article 13(h) of the executive regulations provides that: 
“[...] for the determination of whether the product is sold below their marginal cost or the average 
variable cost the following elements shall be taken into consideration: 
 
1. If the sale will drive out the dominant persons’ competing persons from the market; 
2. If the sale will prevent the dominant person’s competing persons from entering the market; 
3. If the dominant person will be able to increase prices after driving out its competing persons 
from the market; 
4. If the period of time of the sale of a product below its marginal cost or its average variable 
cost will result into the occurrence of any of the aforementioned”24. 
 
In this sense, for a predatory pricing practice to be deemed as abusive, the Egyptian legislator required 
the satisfaction of the above-mentioned elements collectively. For instance, if the pricing below 
marginal or average variable costs by the dominant firm does not drive its competitors out of the 
                                                 
20 Article 8(c), Law No. 3 of 2005 Promulgating the Law on Protection of Competition and Prohibition of 
Monopolistic Practices; Article 13(c), Prime Ministerial Decree No. 1316 of 2005 issuing the Executive 
Regulations of Protection of Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices Law No. 3 of 2005 
21 El-Far, M. (2010) “Enforcement Policy of the Egyptian Competition Law” Competition Law International, 
Journal of the Antitrust Committee of the International Bar Association, [April 2010 issue], p.55 
22 See Report of the Egyptian Competition Authority on the Steel Rebar Market, pp.42-44 
23 Ibid, p.45; El-Far, M. (2010) “Enforcement Policy of the Egyptian Competition Law” Competition Law 
International, Journal of the Antitrust Committee of the International Bar Association, [April 2010 issue], p.55 
24 Article 13(h), Prime Ministerial Decree No. 1316 of 2005 issuing the Executive Regulations of Protection of 
Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices Law No. 3 of 2005 
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market or generate significant entry barriers, then the practice shall not be contemplated as abusive; 
even if the remaining elements were satisfied. The Egyptian legislator, similarly, imposes an effects-
based approach to exclusive dealing abuses. Article 8(i) of Law No. 3/2005 prohibits a dominant firm 
from “obliging a supplier not to deal with a competitor”25. Article 13(i) of the executive regulations 
adds to such stipulation that: “[...] the non-dealing shall mean the refraining from dealing with a 
competing person, whether totally or reducing the size of dealing with him to the extent that would 
drive it out of the market or prevent the potential competitors from entering the market”26. This means 
that a dominant firm is not prohibited from obliging its supplier/distributor from dealing with its 
competitors unless such exclusivity drives the latter out of business or precludes market entry.         
      
Similar to Article 8(c) of Law No. 3/2005 (as discussed above), the Egyptian legislator left it open for 
investigating authorities to choose the approach they find suitable to abusive practices stipulated 
under Articles 8(d) on tying arrangements, 8(f) on the refusal to produce scarce products whenever it 
is economically feasible, and 8(g) on the prevention of competitor(s) from gaining access to the 
dominant firm’s utilities or services; despite being economically viable. Hence, the ECA and Courts 
may either choose to employ an effects-based approach in respect of these practices. 
 
3. Evaluating potential effects on Egyptian economy that may arise from peculiarities in the 
treatment of abuse of dominance    
3.1 The lack of excessive pricing prohibition 
The fact that excessive pricing is not regulated under Egyptian competition law means that firms are 
entitled to set their prices above prevailing market ones. Notwithstanding the plausibility of some of 
the arguments countering the success of excessive pricing27, exercising such practice by large firms 
should not be ruled out; at least in some exceptional circumstances. This may particularly be the case 
in emerging economies like Egypt. In fact, the high levels of concentration that prevail in the 
Egyptian market as a result of the 1991 privatisation programme may increase the chances of 
excessive pricing. This could be the case due to the lack of effective competition culture in many 
sectors. This may also be attributed to the existence of high barriers to entry. For instance, in the fresh 
juice and non-alcoholic beverages industry, there are only 2 or 3 firms that dominate 75% of the 
market. 70% of the fabrics production industry is dominated by only a few firms. In the cement 
industry, while 12 firms operate, only 3 of them account to 70% of total production. The above data 
indicates that the Egyptian market in general is highly concentrated28.        
 
In fact, the Harvard School’s proponents argue in favour of a link between market concentration and 
high prices in a given market; namely the ‘structure, conduct and performance paradigm’. They 
suggest that the structure of a given market identifies the market behaviour of its players that in turn 
verifies its performance. Specifically, they argue that companies that hold substantial market share 
thresholds do essentially have monopoly power that may, in turn, result in high prices29. The question 
                                                 
25 Article 8(i), Law No. 3 of 2005 Promulgating the Law on Protection of Competition and Prohibition of 
Monopolistic Practices 
26 Article 13(i), Prime Ministerial Decree No. 1316 of 2005 issuing the Executive Regulations of Protection of 
Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices Law No. 3 of 2005 
27 See footnote 8 (above)  
28 See Abdellatif, L. M. & Ghoneim, A. F. (2008) “Competition, Competition Policy and Economic Efficiency 
in the MENA Region: The Case of Egypt” Sekkat, K. (Eds.), Competition and Efficiency in the Arab 
World, New York: Palgrave, Macmillan. 
29 See Monti, G. (2007) “EC Competition Law” First Edn., Cambridge University Press, pp.57-59; Peeperkorn, 
L. & Verouden, V. (2007) “The Economics of Competition” The EC Law on Competition, Second Edn., Faull & 
Nikpay (Eds.) Oxford University Press, p.6 
Nevertheless, many Chicago School views remain sceptic about the pragmatism of such approach. For instance, 
see Demsetz, H. (1973) “Industry Structure, Market Rivalry and Public Policy” (3), Journal of Law and 
Economics, pp.1-9    
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that lies beneath this school of thought is how the Egyptian market and economy may incur potential 
losses from high prices in general?   
 
In essence, high prices directly deter consumer welfare30. The core objective of antitrust law should be 
to yield the gains of competition to consumers. Consumer gains in this sense are achieved through 
offering low-priced and quality products accompanied by reasonable choice. Put differently, the 
objective of antitrust is to protect consumers from anti-competitive and exploitative activities that may 
“unfairly” shift welfare from consumers to dominant firms. This shift may not indeed result in total 
welfare maximization; but would merely increase welfare of the dominant firm(s) at stake. Prices set 
above the competitive level tend to generate “allocative inefficiency”. While monopoly raises prices 
and in turn reduces the volume of output. Products that are no longer sold may be valued more for 
future buyers relative to what they would cost the society to manufacture. This entails a case of “pure 
social loss” in a manner that comprises “allocative inefficiency”31.  
 
Moreover, some argue that the likely purpose of antitrust is to promote the efficiency of economies. 
Particularly, it is submitted that “[t]he whole task of antitrust can be summed up as the effort to 
improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either 
no gain or net loss in consumer welfare”32. This means that competition in itself encourages allocative 
efficiency that would inevitably enrich consumer welfare – needless to say that the success of 
excessive pricing may in itself imply lack of competition33. This argument is rationalized by the 
ideology that “the preference for competitive rather than monopolistic resource allocation is most 
clearly explained and firmly based upon a desire to maximize output as consumers value it”34.        
 
In this sense pricing above the competitive level or excessive pricing in particular - in light of the 
foregoing views – is incompatible with the objectives of competition law on the premise that it causes 
an allocative inefficiency and is detrimental to consumer welfare and efficiency of the economy. Such 
effects may indeed be featured in the Egyptian market. For instance, if the price of a particular good 
or service is excessive, consumer welfare may be deterred in a manner that may lead to allocative 
inefficiency - an outcome that may gradually be passed on to the Egyptian economy; depending on 
the importance of that good or service and its usage. In fact, the potential effects of excessive pricing 
may be better explained by two scenarios: first, excessive prices in the primary market, and; second, 
excessive prices in the secondary market. 
 
The first scenario presupposes that excessive prices prevail in the primary market (i.e. market that 
supplies the main product). This scenario assumes that the excessively priced product or service in the 
primary market is complementary to another product or service in the secondary market (e.g. raw 
material). Assume that concrete producers charge excessive prices (primary market). Concrete is 
indeed an essential product for construction (secondary market). Consequently, when concrete prices 
                                                 
30 Consumer welfare may be defined according to Bork, a Chicago School observer, as “maximization of wealth 
or consumer want satisfaction”. See Orbach, B. Y. (2010) “The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox” Arizona 
Legal Studies, Discussion Paper No. 10-07, available from: 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1553226) accessed 28-07-2010, p.11   
However, the framework of consumer welfare that will be employed in this paper does not only cover 
consumers; but also includes suppliers, distributors or retailers; depending on the position of the incumbent firm 
practicing excessive pricing (i.e. producer, distributor, etc.); although the direct effect is posed to consumers. 
31 Kirkwood, J. B. & Lande, R. H. (2008) “The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not 
Increasing Efficiency” 84(1), Notre Dame Law Review, pp.192,197 For more detail on how allocative 
inefficiency is caused by high prices, see Mansfield, E. (1982) “Microeconomics: Theory and Applications” 
Fourth Edn., pp.277-292 
32 Bork, R. H. (1993) “The Antitrust Paradox” Second Edn., New York: Free Press, p.91  
33 See Orbach, B. Y. (2010) “The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox” Arizona Legal Studies, Discussion 
Paper No. 10-07, available from: (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1553226) accessed 28-07-
2010, p.10 
34 Bork, R. H. (1967) “The Goals of Antitrust Policy” (57), American Economic Review, p.245 
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increase, infant and medium-sized construction firms may undeniably be harmed – apart from end-
users in both markets. In fact, if such price increase is lengthy, these construction firms may be driven 
out of the market. In this sense, the effects of excessive prices in the primary market, aside of its 
effects on consumers of that primary product, may have a formidable impact on the secondary market. 
Indeed such cause may have a chilling effect on other corresponding markets as well. The second 
scenario, in contrast with the first, assumes that excessive prices exist in aftermarkets (or secondary 
markets). Aftermarkets are markets that offer goods or services that complement the primary product 
or that are otherwise essential for it (spare parts, maintenance services, etc). Assume that a car 
manufacturer was dominant in the aftermarket of servicing and spare parts where it charged excessive 
prices; as opposed to the primary market (car manufacturing) where it was not dominant and 
prevailing prices were not excessive35. Inevitably, consumers/buyers of that car may incur significant 
financial losses as a result of excessively priced spare parts and maintenance services36.  
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing potential effects, maximizing consumer welfare and attaining 
economic efficiency remains a priority in Egypt. The ECA in several occasions implied that consumer 
gains and economic efficiency lie at the heart of competition law. For instance, former executive 
director of the ECA has once stated that: “competition is not a goal in itself but rather a means for 
Making Markets Work Better For Consumers”37.  
 
Moreover, in a statement of its vision in its Annual Report 2006-2007, the ECA mentioned that it 
“aims to bring benefit to the national economy in general and welfare to the society”38. While the 
attainment of these priorities and aims may seem pragmatic, the aforementioned potential effects of 
excessive prices may suggest otherwise. Some may, however, argue that these potential effects may 
be averted by the application of Articles 10 of the Law No. 3/2005 and 19 of its executive 
regulations39. Particularly, Article 10 of the Law No. 3/2005 provides that: “The Cabinet of Ministers 
may, after taking the opinion of the Authority, issue a decree determining the selling price for one or 
more essential products for a specific period of time. Any agreement concluded by the Government 
for the purposes of the implementation of these prices shall not be considered an anti-competitive 
practice”40. Article 19 of the executive regulations extends on this by providing that: “the Authority 
carries out the necessary studies for the Council of Ministers Cabinet to perform its competence set 
                                                 
35 Although under ordinary circumstances, a firm that holds a dominant position in the primary market will in 
turn be dominant in the related aftermarket. However, this is not always the case. For instance, General Motors 
was not dominant in the cars manufacturing market; whilst being dominant in the aftermarket of conformity 
certificates for cars that were purchased through parallel imports (i.e. imports through car dealers rather than the 
manufacturers) in Belgium. See Commission Decision IV/28.851, General Motors Continental, [1974] O.J. L 
029. Note that this decision was overturned by the Court of Justice. See Case 26/75, General Motors 
Continental v. Commission [1975] E.C.R. 1367. Moreover, in Hugin v. Commission, the Court of Justice upheld 
the Commission’s decision that found Hugin dominant in the market for spare parts of cash machines 
(aftermarket) which Hugin itself produces; as opposed to its position in the primary market. See Case 22/78 
[1979] E.C.R. 1869, 3 CMLR 345.               
36 Indeed reasonable consumers usually inquire about prices in aftermarkets prior to or at the time of purchasing 
the relevant primary product. However, information on pricing in aftermarkets may not always be passed on to 
consumers at the time of purchase either because they did not inquire about aftermarket prices or that 
information was not existent or deliberatively hidden by the seller of the relevant primary product. For more 
insights on aftermarkets, see Mosso, C. E., Ryan, S. A., Alback, S. & Centella, M. L. T. (2007) “Article [102]” 
The EC Law on Competition, Second Edn., Faull & Nikpay (Eds.), Oxford University Press, pp.337-338 
37 Attia, K. (2009) “Introducing Competition Law and Policy - The Case of Egypt” (1), Mediterranean 
Competition Bulletin, p.18   
38 See Annual Report of the Egyptian Competition Authority (2006-2007), p.15 
39 Note that Article 18 of the executive regulations is more or less a replica of Article 10 of Law No. 3/2005. 
40 Article 10, Law No. 3 of 2005 Promulgating the Law on the Protection of Competition and the Prohibition of 
Monopolistic Practices 
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out in Article 10 of the Law regarding the determination of the selling prices of the essential products 
and prepares the reports on the opinion of the Authority on this matter”41. 
 
However, these provisions have hardly been used since the introduction of Law No. 3/2005 and its 
executive regulations. This is in spite of the fact that prices of essential products such as cement and 
red meat have substantially increased throughout the period 2006-2009 and that the ECA had already 
conducted studies on these sectors. Despite these studies found that prices of the mentioned products 
were high, the Council of Ministers Cabinet did not make use of Articles 10 and 1942. This may, 
however, be explained by the fact that Articles 10 and 19 as such are incompatible with Article 10 of 
the Law No. 8/1997 for Investment Guarantees and Incentives which provides that any firm 
incorporated with an aim to engage in any activity will not be subject to any form of price control43.                              
 
3.2 Employing an effects-based approach to abuse of dominance   
As discussed earlier, most of the abusive practices stipulated under Articles 8 of Law No. 3/2005 are 
settled through an effects-based approach, pursuant to Article 13 of the executive regulations. The 
debate over whether investigating authorities should employ a per se approach or effects-based 
analysis in relation to the settlement of competition-related disputes in general is substantial. 
Advocates of a per se approach tend to argue that such approach provides the business community 
with predictability and legal certainty in relation to what is prohibited from what is not. In fact, 
commenting on legal certainty of the per se approach, the Court in U.S. v. Topco Assocs., stated that 
“without the per se rules, business men would be left with little to aid them in predicting in any 
particular case what courts will find to be legal and illegal [...]”44.     
 
Furthermore, some argue that investigating authorities may lack the necessary knowledge to rationally 
resolve matters through an effects-based approach45. Specifically it is often suggested that firms which 
essentially select the practices themselves “may or may not know what is special about [them]. They 
can describe what they do, but the why is more difficult. Only someone with a very detailed 
knowledge of the market process [...] as well as data needed for evaluation would be able to answer 
that question. Sometimes no one can answer it”. He, moreover, added that “what can be conveyed in 
the corporate board room is hard to articulate in a trial, when the judge and jury lack economic 
training and business expertise”46. Not only, however, is knowledge the sole problem. The process of 
discerning the welfare effects of practices often lies “beyond our ken”. The inquiries which effects-
based approaches seek to obtain are often farfetched. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court, while favouring 
a per se approach over an effects-based analysis on the basis of inability, had once stated that: “judges 
often lack the expert understanding of industrial market structures and behavior to determine with any 
confidence a practice’s effect on competition”47. 
                                                 
41 Article 19, Prime Ministerial Decree No. 1316 of 2005 issuing the Executive Regulations of Protection of 
Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices Law No. 3 of 2005 
42 The only essential product that was referred to the Council of Ministers Cabinet due to high prices so far was 
fertilizers. See Report of Egyptian Competition Authority “Study on the Fertilizers Market in the Arab Republic 
of Egypt in light of the Law on Protection of Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices” May 
2007, available from: (http://www.eca.org.eg/ECA/Publication/List.aspx?CategoryID=1) accessed 02-08-2010       
43 Article 10, Law No. 8 of 1997 for Investment Guarantees and Incentives; see also Dabbah, M. M. (2007) 
“Competition Law and Policy in the Middle East” First Edn., Cambridge University Press, p.249   
44 See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609, n.10 (1972)  
45 See Brennan, G. & Buchanan, J. M. (1985) “The Reason of Rules” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 
Christiansen, A. & Kerber, W. (2006) “Competition Policy with optimally differentiated rules instead of per se 
rules vs. rule of reason” 2(2), Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, pp.219-220 
46 Easterbrook, F. H. (1984) “The Limits of Antitrust” 63(1), Texas Law Review, pp.5, 8       
47 See Arizona v. Maricopa, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982). Nevertheless, in a more recent occasion, the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Leegin employed a rule of reason approach to minimum resale price maintenance and 
suggested that such practice may not necessarily be anti-competitive; and hence, a per se approach may not be 
appropriate. See Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 U.S., 2713-2715 (2007)      
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In this respect, one should distinguish between two types of errors which judges (or competition 
authorities) may commit in antitrust disputes. First, falsely ignoring or not condemning practices that 
may be anti-competitive (‘type I errors’) – also known as “false negatives”. Second, erroneously 
condemning practices that yield pro-competitive benefits (‘type II errors’). This category is also 
known as “false positives”. The question that lies beneath this classification: given the likely 
inevitability to avoid errors; what type of errors is more favourable (or less costly) over the other? 
Irrespective of which type is favoured over the other, the decision-maker in question should not 
disregard the fact that by choosing one type (say type II) the inevitable implication would be that 
he/she accepts the costs of the other type of errors (type I in this example); no matter how detrimental 
the effects of these errors are48.  
 
According to Easterbrook, decision-makers should opt for judicial errors that do not condemn 
“questionable practices” essentially based on the premise that: “the economic system corrects 
monopoly [type I errors – unpunished anti-competitive practices] more readily than it corrects judicial 
[type II] errors [pro-competitive practices falsely punished]”. Put differently, this approach seems to 
favour excusing practices that may be anti-competitive on the basis that the market will automatically 
maintain or correct itself. The problem with a per se approach is that it prohibits the “whole” category 
of practices; rather than being premised on case-by-case analysis. That said; type II errors could be 
unavoidable under a per se approach. In this sense, Egyptian investigating authorities, by employing 
an effects-based analysis to abuse of dominance, seem to conform to Easterbrook’s error-cost 
framework by arguably avoiding type II errors (erroneously punishing pro-competitive conducts)49.  
 
However, a key question that should be raised in this respect: is Egypt, as an emerging economy with 
a newly introduced competition law, ready to deploy an effects-based approach to abuse of dominance 
at this particular stage? The mainstream of literature suggests that emerging economies, while new to 
competition law, should avoid employing complex economic analysis. For instance, Mohieldin argues 
that “emerging economies with either little or no experience of administering a complex regulatory 
framework may at first opt for a competition law that can be easily enforced”. In other words, he 
believes that an effects-based approach may not be the best possible approach for emerging 
economies. Instead, these economies should employ the “more straightforward per se approach”50. In 
addition, the dilemma, as Mohieldin writes, is that competition law requires a substantial amount of 
knowledge on the interface between law and economics. Education and practice in emerging 
economies, on the other hand, tend to detach law from economics. Such dividing line makes the task 
harder when it comes to carrying out economic analysis for competition law. Thus legal practitioners 
arguably lack the necessary experience to conduct economic analysis of laws in this particular field51.    
 
Furthermore, some argue that investigating authorities of emerging economies with little experience 
may likely provide a misapplication or improper enforcement of competition laws52. In fact, the 
problem which investigating authorities may face – particularly at the early stages of antitrust 
enforcement - is when it comes to the anticipation of harms or effects caused by abusive practices. 
                                                 
48 See Whish, R. (2008) “Competition Law” Sixth Edn., Oxford University Press, p.190; McChesney, F. S. 
(2010) “Easterbrook on Errors” (10), Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, p.5 
49 Easterbrook, F. H. (1984) “The Limits of Antitrust” 63(1), Texas Law Review, p.15 
Note that the U.S. Supreme Court seems to adopt the same view. See Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law 
Offices of Curtis V Trinko LLP, 540 US 414 (2004)   
50 Mohieldin, M. (2002) “On the Formulation and Enforcement of Competition Law in Emerging Economies: 
The Case of Egypt”. OECD, Global Forum on Competition, Contribution from Egypt, p.3 
51 Ibid, p.5 
52 Mehta, P. S., Agarwal, M. & Singh, V. V. (2007) “Politics Trumps Economics – Lessons and Experiences on 
Competition and Regulatory Regimes from Developing Countries” Intergovernmental Group of Experts on 
Competition Law and Policy, CUTS International, available from: 
(http://www.unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/c2clp_ige8p11Cuts_en.pdf) accessed 05-05-2010, p.24   
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This is indeed the most critical and multifaceted part which investigators encounter while employing 
effects-based analysis. Thus, it is often argued in favour of the necessity of economic expertise as a 
central pre-requisite for successful deployment of effects-based analysis.53. In fact, the likely, yet 
understandably, lack of economic expertise in this field in Egypt may lead to costly judicial errors. 
The cost of these errors may indeed be formidable. Aside of reducing public and government 
confidence in investigating authorities, as some suggest in relation to judicial errors in general, these 
errors may eventually impede foreign direct investment (‘FDI’)54 in Egypt, discourage innovation, and 
impair cross-border transactions and trade. Indeed FDI and trade are generally renowned as vital 
pillars of an economy. If substantially hindered through such errors, these effects may be passed on to 
the economy.    
 
4. Methods to tackle peculiarities   
While the effects that might be generated from the foregoing peculiarities may be potential, it may be 
worthwhile attempting to tackle them. The determination of whether or not a price is excessive is a 
sophisticated process. More specifically, the complexity which competition authorities tend to face in 
investigating excessive pricing relates to the determination of the “competitive price” of the goods or 
services at stake. There appears to be various approaches for such determination. One approach is to 
base such “competitive” price on the incremental cost of production with market demand in mind55. In 
this sense, the product or service at stake is bought by consumers who have no problem in paying 
more than its incremental cost of production. However, this mode of determination assumes that 
markets are “static” and that production is not subject to high economies of scale. This is indeed 
hardly the case. The “competitive” price in dynamic markets for instance is not determined on the 
basis of marginal costs of production. This is because these markets are characterized by low 
incremental costs and high fixed costs and, thus, obtaining the relevant data on costs would not suffice 
for determination “competitive” prices. The investigator, instead, would have to conduct studies that 
survey the number of consumers who intend to pay for the good or service at stake56. 
                 
Furthermore, it is sometimes suggested to avoid employing these price-cost determinants and instead 
rely on a profits-based benchmark. In this sense, prices are contemplated as excessive if the firm at 
glance gains profits that exceed those which were otherwise initially predicted in a “competitive 
market”. Nonetheless this approach is often criticised on the basis of likely estimation impreciseness. 
For instance, complexities in such benchmark may arise when dealing with a set of “related” products 
instead of just one product. In addition, such approach may be impractical if the goods at stake are 
produced, for example, through numerous firm sectors or in more than one country57. 
 
                                                 
53 For instance, see Vanberg, V. J. (2009) “Consumer Welfare, Total Welfare and Economic Freedom – On the 
Normative Foundations of Competition Policy” Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics, 
available from: (http://walter-eucken-institut.de/publikationen/09_03bw.pdf) accessed 15-10-2009, p.24 
54 FDI may be defined as: “ownership and (normally) control of a business or part of a business in another 
country”. It is also renowned as a “driver” for economic development. For an expansive discussion on FDI, see 
Trebilcock, M. J. & Howse, R. (2005) “The Regulation of International Trade” Third Edn., Routledge, London 
and New York, pp.439; Evenett, S. J. (2003) “Links between Development and Competition Law in Developing 
Countries” available from: (www.alexandria.unisg.ch/EXPORT/DL/22249.pdf) accessed 07-05-2010, p.7.    
55 Incremental costs entail the additional cost to produce a larger increment in output. Technically speaking, the 
difference between marginal and incremental costs is minor. While marginal costs refer to the additional cost to 
produce a single unit, incremental costs entail the additional cost to produce a larger volume of output than 
merely one unit. Hence, incremental and marginal costs may overlap when the increment in output is negligible. 
On the classification of costs in general, see O’Donoghue, R. & Padilla, A. J. (2006) “The Law and Economics 
of Article [102 TFEU]” First Edn., Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, pp.237-238    
56 See Evans, D. S. & Padilla, A. J. (2005) “Excessive pricing: using economics to define administrable legal 
rules” 1(1), Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, pp.100-101 
57 Ibid., pp.101-102 
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However, estimation problems do not pose the sole concern in relation to the profits benchmark. A 
further matter is that the accounting proceedings do not take into consideration aspects such as 
inflation, capitalization of research and development, as well as advertising, and that the rates of 
return for risk are not accurately adjusted; all of which lead to unworkable determinations. It is, 
therefore, not surprising to deem the profits benchmark, akin to the price-cost benchmark, as highly 
controversial. Given such sound debate over the appropriate benchmark (and complexity as it 
appears), it may be useful to explore how comparable emerging economies treat excessive pricing. 
Put differently, do they encounter difficulties in the investigation of such practice?58  
 
In Harmony Gold Mining Ltd. & Durban Roodepoort Deep Ltd. v. Mittal Steel South Africa Ltd. & 
Macsteel International B.V. (‘Mittal’), the South African Competition Tribunal (‘Tribunal’) found 
Mittal guilty of charging excessive prices for flat steel. Particularly, it found that Mittal had charged 
import parity prices in the South African market that were substantially higher than its prices in the 
export market59. The Tribunal’s decision was, however, highly controversial. First, it did not conduct 
a comparison between Mittal’s price and the reasonable economic value of flat steel – the method of 
appraisal stipulated under the South African Competition Act60. Thus, the Tribunal did not discern 
whether or not Mittal’s prices were reasonable per se in relation to economic value. Though finding 
Mittal’s prices as excessive, it did not estimate what would have then been the “right price” that 
would have circumvented these allegations. In fact, the Tribunal did not find Mittal guilty on the basis 
of charging import parity prices in the South African domestic market; but instead relied on resale 
prices of flat steel in the domestic market61. 
 
Given the above-mentioned gaps in the Tribunal’s decision, it was not surprising to see that it was 
overturned by the Competition Court of Appeal (‘CAC’). The CAC criticised the Tribunal for not 
comparing the actual price with economic value and suggested that the competition act rather 
presupposes a four-step test that ought to be followed. First, is to identify the actual price that is 
alleged to be excessive; second, to determine the “economic value” of the good or service in question; 
third, to discern whether the actual price exceeds the economic value and, if so, whether the difference 
is “unreasonable”; and, fourth, is to investigate whether such excessive is detrimental to consumers62. 
 
Although the CAC had identified the necessary four-step test as means for inquiry, it still remains 
equivocal how investigating authorities should determine economic value and in turn the 
reasonableness in relation between it and the actual price. In fact, as some rightly suggest: “the CAC’s 
judgement is clearer on how not to assess excessive pricing than it is on how to actually assess it”63. 
                                                 
58 Ibid., pp.102-103; Fisher, F. M. & McGowan, J. J. (1983) “On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to 
Infer Monopoly Profits” (73), American Economic Review, p.82   
59 See South African Competition Tribunal’s decision dated 23rd March, 2007, Mittal Steel South Africa Ltd and 
Macsteel International B.V. Complaint (Case 13/CR/FEB04) 
60 Section 1(1)(ix) of the South African Competition Second Amendment Act 39 of 2000 defines excessive 
pricing as “a price for a good or service which [...] bears no reasonable relation to its economic value of that 
good or service [...]”. This means that investigating authorities are ought to compare the actual price with 
economic value. 
61 See Plessis, L. D. & Blignaut, L. (2009) “Staying safe – dominant firms’ pricing decisions in industries where 
high prices do not attract entry” Third Annual Competition Commission, Competition Tribunal and Mandela 
Institute Conference on Competition Law, Economics and Policy in South Africa, available from: 
(www.compcom.co.za) accessed 22-08-2010, p.6 ; Parr, G. (2007) “South Africa: Excessive pricing – don’t get 
caught in the Mittal!” available from: (http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=52022) accessed 22-08-
2010, p.6  
62 South African Competition Appeal Court’s decision dated 29th May, 2009, Mittal Steel South Africa Ltd and 
Macsteel International B.V. Complaint (Case 70/CAC/Apr07), para.32 
The CAC then returned the case to the Tribunal for reappraisal in light of the mentioned four-step test. Later on, 
however, the case was privately settled.  
63 See Plessis, L. D. & Blignaut, L. (2009) “Staying safe – dominant firms’ pricing decisions in industries where 
high prices do not attract entry” Third Annual Competition Commission, Competition Tribunal and Mandela 
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The Mittal case as such generally illustrates how the practice of excessive pricing is difficult to assess; 
at least at the early stage competition law enforcement64. This indeed explains why the Egyptian 
legislator did not regulate such practice under Law No. 3/2005 at this particular stage. However, given 
the potential effects that may be generated from this practice, it may still be suggested to re-consider 
regulating excessive pricing in the future. This should precisely be the case if the practice continues to 
pose risks on the market and economy.    
 
Likewise, employing an effects-based approach at this stage may be questionable due to the potential 
effects of errors that may derive from the relative lack of economic expertise in competition law65. 
However, the ECA’s legal and economic analysis in the studies it conducted so far suggests that it is 
capable of competently employing such approach. While the effects of type II errors may be 
substantial on the market, particularly in relation to falsely condemned firms, and given that this 
category of errors is more likely committed through a per se approach, it may be suggested stick by an 
effects-based analysis. However, investigating authorities should be cautious; particularly with 
practices that have questionable effects on the market. In any event, cooperation with competition 
authorities of the developed world remains indispensable.               
  
5. Conclusion 
This paper exemplified two peculiarities under Egyptian Competition Law. With respect to the 
misrecognition of excessive pricing, and notwithstanding the potential effects that may arise from 
such practice, Mittal shows that the Egyptian legislator seems to have adopted the right approach not 
to regulate it at this stage. In fact, had the legislator regulated excessive pricing at this stage, and due 
to the complexities in calculation of the competitive price, this may have led to type II errors 
(erroneously condemning pro-competitive practices). In this case, the likely costs of committing this 
category of errors may outweigh the detrimental effects of the practice itself. 
 
The Law No. 3/2005 and executive regulations seem to require an effects-based approach to most 
abusive practices. The pros of such approach, as opposed to a per se approach, is that type II errors 
may be avoided. Although it is often argued that an effects-based analysis may not be the best of 
approaches to emerging economies with newly introduced competition laws and least experience, the 
ECA’s analysis in the studies it conducted until current exemplifies that it is capable of employing 
such approach. Hence, an effects-based approach may still be the suggested method of analysis; so 
long as a cautious approach is adopted in relation to that generate questionable anti-competitive 
practices. However, whether for the purposes of regulating excessive pricing in the future or 
employing an effects-based approach, and apart from the necessity of cooperating with competition 
authorities of the developed world, increasing economic expertise in competition law in Egypt 
remains vital.      
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64 Particularly given that Mittal represents the first excessive pricing case in South Africa. 
65 On the judicial level, however, the Egyptian government introduced the Law No. 120 of 2008 Establishing 
Economic Courts. Competition-related disputes, among several other related fields, are now subject to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of economic courts. This development indeed serves as a positive implication for the 
future of economic expertise in Egypt.    
